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Economic activity is inherently variable and monitoring it is a major challenge, especially 
in regional economies where resources are fewer and activity is more variable.  Using a 
recent study of the Riverland region, the authors set out the information available, its 
limitations and means by which it may be extended.  It is argued that monitoring must 
respond to specific needs and extend to information beyond the scope of the merely 
economic.  It is not simply a matter of tracking commonly used economic variables but of 
understanding specific economic challenges and using that understanding to target 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Our first task is to define the term regional economy.  For the purposes of this paper, 
regional economies are those inside nations and, in Australia’s case, mostly inside States.  
They are not groups of nations (as the term is sometimes used) but parts of a nation, 
within the global system.   
 
The second task is to justify the paper.  The topic of monitoring regional economies is 
important partly because the task is difficult.  One reason for the difficulty is that regional 
economies are often small, isolated, rural economies and so are more subject to 
variations, due to the vagaries of weather and to their typically higher dependencies on 
external markets and competitors.  Another reason is that regional economies also lack 
the resources for data collection and it is commonly understood that  “collecting primary 
data (about regional economies) is often difficult” (Schirmer and Case, 2003, p38).  Our 
experience (and this paper arises largely from the authors’ involvement with a recent 
study of the Riverland region of South Australia) suggests further that members of 
regional economies have misconceptions about what data are available and about how 
significant their region is to the national economy of which they are part.
3  The task is 
therefore difficult because good information is needed to correct these misunderstandings.  
 
Given that background, which the authors are not the first to encounter
4, this paper 
addresses those difficulties.  Firstly, in section 2, it clarifies the purposes of monitoring 
regional economies, arguing the task is justified primarily for policy-making purposes.  
Section 2 also shows, as a corollary, that monitoring for economic purposes is a task 
greater than monitoring the merely economic and must include social and environmental 
matters.   
                                                 
3 One revealing misconception was the view that because data are available for the national economy must 
also be available regionally.  But that is not true.  Much of the data used for national aggregates not 
summations of all regions but extrapolations from survey results and cannot be used to infer reliable data 
about small regions.  In addition, some of the data collected to make estimates for the national economy 
come from corporations which operate in a number of locations but who are asked only for the national 
totals of their activity.  That too will not make regional data available even though it exists at a national 
level. 
4 Many other researchers have come across what has been described as “gaps between different knowledge 
systems and perspectives” (Aslin and Brown, 2004, p7)   3
That latter point is a major theme of this paper which we develop further.  Section 3 
demonstrates a simple but fundamental point: even when we ask a straightforward 
economic question: is there a crisis in the region, the economic data currently available 
are much less than are needed.  But the lack of data does not in itself mean that 
government or regions should do more monitoring.  Rather, data collection and estimation 
must fit particular purposes.  Section 4 looks at one kind of question broadly relevant in 
regional economies: how able is a particular regional economy to respond to some 
specific economic challenges.  Again we make the point that economic monitoring 
extends beyond the obviously economic. 
 
We hope that this study will help other researchers by setting out what have proven to be 
useful but less well-known data sources, both formal and informal.  It might also heighten 
awareness of the likely expectations of regional communities regarding monitoring so 
that they may be handled in a way that promotes understanding. 
 
 
2.  Why monitor regional economies 
 
Monitoring regional economies is useful for a number of reasons but we must be careful 
about the reasoning.  For example a commonly heard but flawed reason is that we must 
monitor closely because we can manage only what we can measure.  That is not so.  
Consider, for example, that much policy is concerned with market failures involving 
externalities.  These are, by definition, interactions for which a market price is missing 
and hence valuing them (especially at the margin) is problematic at best and often 
impossible.  Nonetheless externalities must be managed and governments commonly do 
so.  To limit management to what can be measured is to limit it beyond reason and 
practice. 
 
Another often used but somewhat doubtful justification is that monitoring is needed to 
provide information investors need.  That purpose immediately raises the question of why 
the need does not call forth an optimal amount of monitoring?  There are several answers, 
all reasons to think that private purposes lead to too little monitoring.  One is that change 
in economic activity, both decline or growth, has threshold values after which it becomes 
self-sustaining (see Coombs, 2001, p 49).     4
This is the notion that there is a critical mass of economic activity.  In other words, it 
might be that private decisions have additional public effects.  That provides a broad, 
market failure rationale for monitoring regional economies.  However, note that it might 
be sharply limited.  The only threshold consistently identified in the literature is that of a 
minimum size; a critical mass below which a regional economy loses services such as 
health and education, without which it slides into oblivion.  The problem is real enough, 
as can be seen from the ghost towns that are so common in regional Australia.  However, 
estimates of that critical size are small, as small as 3000, and so are much smaller than 
many of the regions that might be monitored.  If the primary purpose of monitoring is to 
maintain a watching brief over the region’s size as it approaches a minimum, there will be 
no great need for it. 
 
A broader, more adequate public purpose to monitoring is the notion that knowing the 
size and prosperity of a region might be import to policy makers because of the 
contribution these economic variables make to other public goals.
5  If, for example, large 
and wealthy regions better care for the environment, then that non-economic goal of 
government gives reason for monitoring: poorer regions would be targets for 
environmental programs.  This justification seems quite powerful.  It is plausible that 
social goals too, goals such as reducing domestic violence or increasing racial tolerance, 
might be advanced, in part, by keeping track of regional economies.  That is all to say that 
monitoring regional economies is probably most strongly justified for achieving non-
economic goals.
6  The strictly economic purposes are probably served by the small 




                                                 
5 At the least it is true that Australian Governments have long been concerned to foster a more even spatial 
distribution of economic growth than would arise without their assistance (Beer, et al, 2003, pp253-4). 
6 Some economists would argue that government’s environmental and social purposes are also forms of 
market failure.  The logic of that position seems compelling: these are instances where government is 
imposing by fiat outcomes that would not be arrived at by competitive market forces.  That is the same sort 
of distortion as is created when private decisions which fuel competitive behaviour fail to take all flow on 
effects into account, which was the case with the notion of a critical mass and of self-sustaining decline.  
However, it might be a misnomer to call social and environmental policies market failures if we mean that 
by correcting for them we necessarily improve the welfare derived.  These policies are better understood as 
instances where government leads (rather than relies on consumers’ preferences) because it judges existing 
notions of value to be wrong. 
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3.  How would we know if there were an economic crisis? 
 
There is one other reason government might want to increase monitoring, at least at 
particular times, and that is political.  A relatively common scenario is where a Minister 
wants advice from policy makers because some people are claiming that a region is 
experiencing an economic crisis.  This section focuses on that simple and direct economic 
question in order to reveal the limitations on current economic data.  The question of 
filling those gaps by using proxies is also considered. 
 
We are mostly familiar with the basic categories of economic data that might be used for 
regional monitoring.  These are the same as are reported for national economies viz, 
income, wealth, capital flows, unemployment, retail spending.  However, when we look 
at a regional level we find that these data are mostly unavailable, making it difficult, 
without additional data collection, to know something so basic as whether a region is 
suffering a crisis or not.
 7  Fortunately, in most cases, useful proxies are available and the 
following discussion considers them. 
 
We start with measures of regional income.  Income data are basic to economic 
monitoring.  Income is defined as a measure of the flow of resources that can be 
consumed in the current period without diminishing the region’s wealth.  So we can speak 
of gross regional product (GRP), just as we do about Gross Domestic Product, (GDP), as 
the flow of resources that may be sustainably derived from the stock of regional wealth.  
Of course, that is equal to the amount of value which is added to the inputs purchased 
during the year.  Unfortunately, there are no regional value added statistics and so no 
GRP figures.   
 
Even the national GDP figures commonly quoted are just estimates of value added made 
in part by survey and subsequently checked (and often subsequently revised) against 
                                                 
7 The ABS describe the limited regional data it holds as follows: “Estimated Resident Population, some 
Census data, Births and Deaths, Unemployment, Income Support Customers, Taxable Income, Building 
Approvals, Motor Vehicle Sales and Agriculture” 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/1379.0.55.002Main+Features12000%20to%202004?Ope
nDocument.  We deal with the same categories below.   6
aggregate flows of savings, expenditure and capital in what are called “annual balanced 
supply and use tables” (ABS, 2007, p656).
8  None of that is done for regions. 
 
The best information available for regional income is provided from individual income 
tax returns which the ATO can make available by post code.
9  Those data were published 
by ABS in the years 1994-2003.
10  Data for subsequent years can be obtained in 
unpublished form.
11  While these data are very different from estimates of regional 
product, they are the best available.  In terms of our question of whether a region is 
experiencing an economic crisis, these data are useful partial indicators.  However, it is 
important to be aware of the limitations.   
 
Firstly, personal income data are not confined to activities within the postcode areas in 
which the residents live.  If a resident of a person from the region derives income from a 
property in, say, the State capital, that is counted in the ATO data even though it is not 
income generated within the region.  That makes these income figures more like gross 
national product (GNP) than GDP data.
12  Secondly, the personal income data also 
exclude public sector organisations, including Local Governments and private sector 
organisations like companies and cooperatives.   Both are significant limitations. 
 
Wealth is another key economic statistic.  It is a measure of the stock of assets and 
measuring and remeasuring regional wealth is an important part of the monitoring task.  
However, if income data are unavailable, it should be no surprise that a more complicated 
element such as a measure of regional wealth is also unavailable.   
 
There are some estimates of wealth for the national economy but they have become 
available only relatively recently.   Those data are constantly improving but do not cover 
                                                 
8 Estimates are made using the so-called income, expenditure and production approaches and are then 
integrated with the supply and use tables. 
9 Other regional economic data may also be created from the ATO income tax compilations, although work 
in this area is limited and sporadic.  For example, small business income can be derived from ATO records 
and the ABS has described this as “a potentially rich source of economic data” but it has collated and 
published the data only on an experimental basis (see 5675.0 - Experimental Estimates, Regional Small 
Business Statistics, Australia, 1995-96 to 1999-00). 
10 ABS (2004) Regional Statistics – South Australia Cat no. 1362.4.   
11 ATO (2004) Taxation Statistics 2003-2004: A summary of tax returns for the 2003-04 income year.  Also 
available at http://www.ato.gov.au/tax professionals/content.asp?doc=/content/70906.htm 
12 GDP includes the income foreigners earn in Australia and excludes the income Australians earn overseas.  
GNP does the opposite.   7
all components of wealth, especially natural assets not used in economic production.  It is 
likely these values are much greater than those which are reported by the ABS (World 
Bank, 1995).  Social capital, in the form of “networks, shared norms … which facilitate 
cooperation ...” (ABS, 2006), is also excluded.  Importantly, both of those missing 
elements are likely to be even more important parts of regional economies than they are 
for city-dominated national economies. 
 
While detailed wealth data are unavailable, some partial information does exist which are 
useful in answering the economic crisis question.  In South Australia, the State 
government’s Land Services Group provides annual estimates of the value of real estate.  
Those data are used by Local Councils to establish rateable property values and similar 
data exist in other Australian States and Territories.  The estimates are made by recording 
sales in January and February of residential, commercial/industrial, rural and vacant land 
and the data become available in June each year.  The estimates are aggregates of land 
values and improvements.  While these are, of course, not full estimates of wealth, they 
are nonetheless useful and not simply because property values are a major component of 
wealth but also because the value of many of a regional economy’s assets and attractions, 
such as its infrastructure and services, are capitalised into land values.  That is to say that, 
in the absence of better data, monitoring changes in land values is the best proxy we have 
for monitoring the wealth of regional economies.  Its relevance to the question at hand is 
that a region in crisis is unlikely to be a region accumulating wealth in the form of real 
property. 
 
After income and wealth, the next major category of economic data of interest is that of 
capital flows.  Its relevance is that a region in crisis is likely to experience capital flight; 
conversely, capital inflow is an indication that the region is not in crisis.  These data also 
have a powerful political dimension.  While studying the Riverland region, the authors 
often heard the lament that companies operating in the region were not reinvesting profits 
made there but were withdrawing capital from the region.   
 
This is similar to the arguments made at a national level concerning so-called foreign 
direct investment.  To gain insight into the issue would require estimates of all elements 
of what nationally are called the balance of payments statistics (also known as the 
nation’s external accounts).  In other words, we would need to know how much has been   8
invested into the region during the current period, net that against what locals have 
invested elsewhere, compare that to profits retained in the region by outside investors and 
to profits made elsewhere by locals and repatriated to the region.     
 
It should not be a surprise to learn that such detailed payments statistics are unavailable 
for regions and so capital flows cannot be calculated.  The best we can do is reason by 
deduction that a region with a trade deficit (ie a surplus of imports over exports) is likely 
to be a destination of capital from other regions.  While it is likely that some regional 
economies are trade deficit areas, the data to show that are unavailable.
13  Beyond that, all 
that is possible is to employ estimates of the income flows to and from individuals as has 
been done by the National Institute of Economic and Industry Research as part of their 
regional monitoring work (NIEIR, 2005).  These are estimates of the inflows to 
individuals (in the forms of wages, business and property incomes, interest and dividend 
payments and Centrelink payments) and of the outflows from individuals (in the forms of 
taxes and interest paid on past borrowings).  As such they are incomplete for individuals 
and, as with the personal income data, they exclude flows to and from governments, 
companies and other incorporated bodies. 
 
The most comprehensive and timely economic data available at a regional level are the 
estimates of employment and unemployment made by the Commonwealth Department of 
Employment and Workplace Resources.
14  Those data are available for all postcode 
regions within Australia since 1995.  Of course, like the other data, these too have their 
limitations.  Of particular importance when monitoring rural economies is the fact that 
they do not include estimates of underemployment.   
Many farmers have slack periods during a growing season and, in times of drought, many 
have difficulty registering as unemployed.  The DEWR data will not deal with those 
difficulties.  However, these data should be thought of as highly useful in answering the 
question of whether a region is facing an economic crisis – that must be thought unlikely 
if unemployment is relatively low or falling significantly. 
 
                                                 
13 Although, because of the complications caused by borrowing and lending, this is not quite the same as 
concluding that direct investors have made a net contribution on balance. 
14Small Area Labour Markets data available from: 
http://www.workplace.gov.au/workplace/Category/Publications/LabourMarketAnalysis/SmallAreaLabour
Markets-Australia.htm     9
The last category of economic data that might be used to assess if the region is in crisis is 
that of consumption spending: again, a region in crisis is unlikely to have strong or 
rapidly rising consumption spending.  However, no group is regularly, let alone 
frequently, collecting such information comprehensively.  In our study of the Riverland, 
we were able to make use of data from V-Facts (2006) which show motor vehicle 
registrations by post code.  Further information was obtained by informal discussions 
with various regionally based businesses and, although the veracity of such information 
should be questioned because of the dangers of systematic bias, it is highly relevant and 
therefore useful to the task. 
 
The point of this section has been to reveal a simple but to some counter-intuitive or 
unexpected point: no one is monitoring even the most basic information about regional 
economies, even when we limit the area of interest to economic matters alone.  This 
fundamental point may be confirmed by looking at a range of recent reports
15, many of 
which rely on ABS Census data, collected only once every five years.
16  A scan of the 
data bases at university libraries provides further confirmation.
17   There are some useful 
data available but they are proxies for comprehensive information and amount to much 
less than is available at a national level.   
 
However, as intimated above, the dearth of information for monitoring regional 
economies does not mean that major efforts should be made to collect or estimate more.  
Credible attempts to do so show that it can be expensive and time consuming (see for 
example Byron, et al, 2006, which shows how complicated the task can be).  The critical 
point, pursued in the following section, is that monitoring must have a purpose and 
defining that purpose defines the information to be gathered. 
 
 
                                                 
15 For example, a recent proposal to collect economic data for the North Coast regions of NSW had a wish 
list that included many data that are generally unavailable eg industry mix; which sectors are declining and 
which are emerging; size (turnover) and life cycle of businesses; production volumes and values; range and 
nature of products and their destinations; terms of employment; capacity of infrastructure to meet existing 
demands, etc (Mid North Coast Regional Development Board) 
16 See, for a recent example, the reports written for the DAFF and the Mildura Rural City Council by 
Scholefield Robinson Mildura and Blueprint Consulting during 2006. 
17 For example, the University of Sydney offers advice about regional statistics available from the Internet, 
the vast majority of which are for the USA. Australian information is predominantly ABS Census data 
(http://www.library.usyd.edu.au/subjects/economics/statsinternet.html).   10
4.  Monitoring regional economies is not monitoring economics 
 
The previous section considered data available to answer the simple, direct economic 
question: is there a regional crisis?  This section looks beyond the simple question and 
shows that the information relevant to more complicated economic questions is far greater 
than merely economic information.  That proposition has a corollary: economising and 
targeting information collection to particular purposes is required. 
 
In the case of the Riverland study, the work had been commissioned initially because of 
severe downturns in the local wine grape and citrus industries.  That established the 
immediate task of collecting information on those industries, which was done through the 
local industry associations and through the Phylloxera and Grape Industry Board of South 
Australia (PGIBSA), and the Citrus Board of South Australia.  This work generated a 
time series of output and price data which showed that the citrus industry was in long 
term, albeit gentle decline while wine grapes, having boomed in years up to 2002, were 
suffering major and rapid price declines. 
 
The first task was to use information set out in section 3 to determine if the region were in 
crisis, which it wasn’t: income and wealth have been increasing, the region is a net 
recipient of income flows and its jobs performance has been good.
18  
Overall, the Riverland had been keeping up with the rest of the State in economic terms, 
although it has been struggling to maintain its share of population.   
 
However, given the paucity and lack of timeliness of this information, as discussed in 
section 3, further information was collected directly and informally.  This was critical.  
By speaking with local business people, especially traders and financiers, we were able to 
show that retail sales were being maintained at healthy levels and there were no more 
                                                 
18 The data show that  
•  income in the Riverland economy is variable but the gap against the rest of the State has been 
closing; 
•  property values in the Riverland have increased more quickly than for the State as a whole and that 
performance has improved in recent years; 
•  a net inflow of funds to individuals which has been increasing; 
•  after years of poor performance, in recent times unemployment has been lower than in SA as a 
whole; and, 
•  after growth during the 1990s, population has been falling in the Riverland up until the most recent 
estimate in 2005 which shows the first increase for 6 years. 
 .   11
than usual foreclosures on indebted properties.  Those facts would be inconsistent with a 
region in crisis. 
 
Given we were reasonably sure there was no current crisis, the second question examined 
was whether one was about to develop.  To answer that we extrapolated industry trends 
and discussed the resulting prospects with local industry organisations.  We then fed those 
expectations into a regional, input-output model to determine the flow-on effects.  That 
showed the region was facing a significant downturn if trends continued, although not one 
so severe as to be outside the experience of many community members (the Riverland 
region had been through a larger, longer downturn in the period 1992 to c1996).   
However, during the course of the study, the 2006-07 water allocation to Riverland 
irrigators was reduced to only 60% of the full amount and members of the study steering 
committee were insistent that the effects of that reduced allocation and of another dry 
year in 2007 must also be included in the projections.  When that was done, it showed 
that the effect of continued drought through 2007-08 would be devastating, with potential 
cumulative losses equal to some 25% of GRP over the period to 2010.   
 
While there was considerable concern regarding the impact of the drought, the steering 
committee also decided to refocus its efforts on the underlying strategic issues with which 
the study began: why were the wine grape and citrus industries in decline and what did 
we need to know about the region to know how well it could respond to those forces?   
By following that reasoning it became obvious that the economic questions required non-
economic information if useful answers were to be found. 
 
We already knew that, unlike some other regions
19, the Riverland economy had failed to 
diversify its economy and was more than ever dependent on wine grapes in particular.  
While tourism and other horticultural crops such as almonds were making an increasing 
contribution, wine grapes and citrus made up more than 60% of agricultural employment 
and agriculture made up more than 30% of estimated regional value added.  Both ratios 
were almost the same as they had been in 1986. 
 
                                                 
19 As the Australian government has put it “non-metropolitan economies are becoming more diversified, 
with most of the labour force employed outside the agriculture industry.  Tourism has been a popular choice 
for diversification just about everywhere” (DoTAR, 2003, p 14). 
   12
To determine what further information should be collected required a strategic analysis of 
the industries.  Some of that work had been done during the preceding years in two 
studies conducted by PIRSA (PIRSA 2005, PIRSA 2006).  The themes which emerged 
were those of globalisation, especially the importance to these Riverland industries of 
more and more distant markets, competitors and suppliers; rationalised supply chains, 
including higher retail concentration, rapid vertical integration among our competitors 
and generally poor relations between growers and processors were also critical; so too 
was the increased pace of technological change and the importance of proprietorial 
varieties; product differentiation and market segmentation, especially the importance of 
niche customers but in much larger, more distant markets were also critical elements in 
the changing strategic landscape.  The messages from this were straightforward: 
aggregate; look further afield; work with others along the supply chain; adopt new 
practices.  The information needed would tell us how able were people in the Riverland to 
respond in these ways. 
 
An extensive search turned up some relevant information.  It is important to realise that 
much of it came from surveys undertaken for health and education service provision and 
not for economic analysis.  The previous research made it possible to see that the 
Riverland has some attributes critical to its strategic response.  For example, it was clearly 
important that a region be able to deal with foreigness (foreign customers, agents, tastes, 
etc).   
In that regard we found that the Riverland is well placed, being highly culturally diverse 
with low levels of discrimination and high foreign language proficiency (DH, 2006). 
 
It is also important that the region has a significant accumulation of what some have 
called social capital ie social coherence and connectedness needed as a basis for 
cooperation and collaboration which are in turn needed to secure the advantages of 
aggregation.  We found that the Riverland community is safe, so that people feel secure 
and exhibit high levels of trust.  We also found an economy in which people were 
relatively optimistic. 
 
Although the Riverland had this impressive array of social characteristics, the monitoring 
process also revealed a range of weaknesses, primary among them being the relatively   13
poor education and skills of its people and their relatively slow technology uptake, as 
evidenced by the spread of information and communication technologies. 
 
We also read back through the many previous reports written of the Riverland and these 
showed us that growers had some maladaptive attitudes (Trojan, 1980; OLG 1989; RDC 
1994; SACES 1999 a and b).  In particular, while the future required collaboration, 
growers were unwilling to sacrifice autonomy and many of them had a history of acting 
opportunistically, creating some short term, individual gains but inevitably long term, 
collective losses.  While it was critical to make hard headed decisions about leaving or 
staying within the key industries, many growers did not see agriculture as a business.  
While globalisation was exposing them to unbridled market forces, many growers 
continued to think of government help as critical to their survival. 
 
It became clear while collecting this non-economic information that much more of it 
would be needed if the study were to penetrate the matters critical to the future of this 
regional economy.  To that end, consultants were hired: business firm PKF to consider 
financial matters and researchers from the Hawke Institute for Sustainable Communities, 
located at the University of South Australia, to undertake more social research. 
 
That work produced some useful information, relevant to the broad strategic questions.  It 
was also diverted into deeper consideration of the drought and showed there was a 
growing perception that water was the key to the future and that the region was at risk if 
the dry year of 2006-07 were repeated ie exactly the point made from the modelling of 
projections.   
 
Beyond that the consultants were asked to focus on the matter of off-farm income.  There 
is very little information about this matter.  The consultants were able to report that it 
plays a critical role in the Riverland economy, especially for small orchardists and 
vineyard owners.  Off-farm income is important for at least two reasons.  Firstly, it can 
alleviate some of the fall out from the declines in wine grapes and citrus industries; but, 
secondly, it can reduce the pressure to reform current practices so that people continue 
doing the same thing in the same way long after it is has ceased to be economically 
viable.  The research was valuable but only led us to wish that we knew more about these 
matters.   14
 
The consultants were also able to report that the community had highly ambivalent and 
sometimes contradictory attitudes to government and to big business.  Confirming 
previous studies, government was seen by current incumbents as critical to the future but 
it was also seen as parsimonious and was mistrusted.  Large corporate players in the 
industries were commonly seen as providing growth but of competing unfairly with small 
growers and of “sucking the river dry” as more than one interviewee put it. 
 
Overall, the work of the consultants provided some of the extra information that was 
needed.  Two major points need to be emphasised.  Firstly, little of the information that 
was needed and less of the information that was sought was what is commonly thought of 
as economic information.  We needed to know much more about the community, about 
the social milieu, if we were to understand what needed to change to improve the ability 
of the region to respond to the challenges it was facing.  Secondly, what we found out 
was useful but insufficient.  Much more was needed regarding critical considerations such 
as how to make the region more welcoming of new investment.   
 
We also needed much more about the willingness of growers to cooperate with each other 
and with processors (especially wineries) along the supply chain.  In short, the 
information and monitoring we needed to do involved subtle issues and required broad 
and yet focussed information.  But such information is difficult and costly to collect and 
the key point is that such work can only be done if it is focussed on particular issues 
facing particular regions.  There is no one size that fits all. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions    
 
This paper comes out against significantly increasing publicly funded, on-going 
monitoring of regional economies.  Of course, more information is better than less and we 
have not argued that there are no benefits of on-going monitoring, only that there are 
unlikely to be net benefits. 
 
When responding to the commonly asked question of whether a region is in an economic 
crisis, we have found that the data available are generally inadequate.    15
Some useful proxies exist for some of the basic data which are missing but, in general, the 
best way to monitor what is going on in a regional economy is by informal, ad hoc 
means, especially by speaking with local traders and financiers. 
 
We have argued from an economic viewpoint and concluded that any monitoring to 
answer any specific, economic question (beyond the general question of the “Do we have 
a crisis?” sort) will necessarily require data from beyond economics and particularly will 
often require information about social characteristics.  In relating our applied work in 
South Australia’s Riverland, we have recognised that some of this information is 
collected for non-economic purposes and an assessment of specific economic questions 
should always include a review of such data. 
 
Finally, we recognise that many regions have economic development offices which need 
economic data for investment attraction. While information for this specific purpose has 
not been the primary focus of our paper, we conclude by suggesting that what is needed 
for potential investors is not precise detail about the flow variables of income, investment, 
population, employment, etc.   
Rather, broadly accurate reporting of stock variables is likely to be more useful.  What an 
investor needs to know from development officers is about regional infrastructure, local 
suppliers, customers and rivals and about natural assets.  In other words, investment 
attraction is best progressed not by not monitoring change in regional economies but by 
describing underlying, relatively immutable locational advantages.  
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